In Proof of Stake (PoS) networks, users must stake their assets to vouch for the honesty of individual consensus nodes, so that other network participants can trust the network to secure their assets. If consensus nodes are found to be malicious, the tokens they have staked must be slashed to prevent consensus node collusion and the "nothing at stake" problem that can arise in proof-of-stake systems. In most PoS networks, operators and their delegators are penalized if they are frequently offline or double-sign. This is because their consensus node sets are permissionless, meaning anyone can join with enough stake and cannot be evicted. These rules are baked in the automated consensus mechanism and expose delegators to risks such as consensus node misconfiguration, as well as software or hardware failures. This contradicts the Byzantine nature of Tendermint's consensus mechanism, which, by definition, should account for and accommodate failures. In fact, in most cases, these faults do not impact the network's operation and can arise from circumstances beyond the operators' control. Consequently, due to most of these slashing conditions being unrelated to actual security concerns, slashing does not add any security to the network and has negative consequences. By forcing consensus nodes to be online 24/7 and immediately slashing their stake for any mistake or human error, it discourages delegators from staking their assets and makes it impossible to run a node in a home environment, driving network operators towards centralized cloud service providers like AWS.
Unlike other PoS chains, KIRA uses a unique approach to managing uptime and downtime for its consensus nodes. Instead of penalizing delegators through "slashing" when their selected nodes go offline, KIRA uses a system of "ranks" to incentivize uptime and create a friendly, competitive environment. KIRA does not expect 100% uptime from its consensus nodes and therefore does not penalize their delegators for downtime. This is possible because the consensus node set is governance-curated and every node maintains equal voting power in the consensus, making it possible to quickly evict any malicious operators. Additionally, not penalizing for downtime allows network operators to host their nodes in home environments rather than in large data centers, reducing costs and increasing decentralization. The expected minimum uptime for validators is outlined in the off-chain Code of Conduct agreement, which is accessible through the data registry. Consensus nodes that do not comply with this agreement can be evicted by the governance, which enforces its own network operation rules. To protect against double-spend attacks, KIRA uses a single slashing condition related to double-signing, which is only triggered in specific situations.