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| | | | | Minimum transaction fee that must be sent in order to submit any on-chain message. Global transaction spam protection measure. |
| | | | | Maximum transaction fee that can be sent along any transaction type. Prevents potential loss of funds while specifying wrong transaction fee amount by the user. |
| | | | | Required, minimum percentage of governance members with permission to vote on a given proposal to make said proposal valid. If minimum quorum is not reached then passing said proposal is not possible. |
| minimum_proposal_end_time | | | | Minimum time that proposals must be active and default time for all proposals to remain pending. Duration time of individual proposal can be modified by governance as explained here. |
| | | | | Minimum time for the proposals to take effect after they passed |
| | | | | Minimum number of blocks during which the proposals MUST remain active. This is used to prevent edge cases where minimum_proposal_end_time is set to value shorter than a single block time, thus making it impossible to vote in time. |
| min_proposal_enactment_blocks | | | | Minimum number of blocks that must pass after proposal passed for the proposal to take effect. |
| enable_foreign_fee_payments | | | | Allow transaction fee payments with tokens other than KEX |
| mischance_rank_decrease_amount | | | | When it's certain that validator is offline and failed to participate in a block production, decrease its global rank by the specified value. |
| | | | | How many consecutive blocks must the validator miss for the network to change validator status to inactive |
| | | | | How many consecutive blocks must the validator miss for the network to be certain that the node is offline and not participating in the block signing |
| inactive_rank_decrease_percent | | | | By what percentage should the validator global rank decrease when the said validator node status changes to inactive due to not participating in signing new blocks. |
| poor_network_max_bank_send | | | | |
| | | | | Minimum number of consensus nodes that must be active for the network to be considered healthy. If number of validators falls below this value then poor network conditions occur. |
| | | | | Maximum amount of time before which a jailed node can request to be unjailed before becoming permanently jailed.(tombstoned). |
| | | | | Enables whitelist of tokens transferable on the network |
| | | | | Enable blacklist of tokens transferable on the network |
| min_identity_approval_tip | | | | |
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| | | | | Maximum amount of additional KEX that can be created per year by the UBI module |
| | | | | Percentage cut a block proposer takes from the block’s transaction fees rewards. |
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| | | | | Period of time in seconds over which current KEX supply is inflated by inflation_rate |
| | | | | Undelegation cooling period (in seconds) |
| | | | | Maximum number of delegators allowed per staking pool above which min_delegation_pushout can be triggered. |
| | | | | The minimum stake multiplier amount a user need to provide to push out the weakest delegator of a staking pool who reach its max_delegators capacity |
| | | | | The time window in in seconds in which a collusion of double-signing event must occur in order for a slashing proposal to be automatically rised |
| | | | <31​ of active nodes | The percentage threshold of consensus nodes that must double-sign within the time window slashing_period in order for a slashing proposal to be automatically rised. |
| | | | | Maximum percentage of slashing that can be applied by governance to a jailed consensus node. |
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